Cole then filed a notice of appeal and the Second Appellate District appointed counsel, who filed an opening brief under Wende, stating there were no appealable grounds.
2nd Appellate District Court of Appeals
By involving both appointed counsel and the Court of Appeal in poring over the record reasonably arguable issues, presumably on the Argus-inspired theory that the more eyes, the better, Wende’s procedures are able to fulfill their chief purpose, noted above, of “prophylactically safeguarding” the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during his first appeal of right. Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 265, 273, 276.
Wende’s procedures, however, are part and parcel of their constitutional justification: “When [a] defendant ‘has no underlying constitutional right to [the effective assistance of appointed counsel],’ he ‘has no constitutional right to insist on the [Wende] procedures which were designed solely to protect that underlying constitutional right.” In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, at 973, quoting Pa. v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 554.
Nonetheless, sometimes a defendant has a constitutionally grounded, due process right to appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. That right is a limited one, however, and only applies once defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to postconviction relief, i.e., in coram nobis petition, in 1437 proceedings if a prima facie case is shown, in a habeas corpus, and in a 1473.7 proceeding at the trial court level.
However, the California Supreme Court has held that “there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel” in postconviction proceedings. People v. Bayer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412.
Consequently, the full panoply of procedures set forth in Wende do not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief, even if defendant might have the right to appointment of counsel. When counsel is appointed, in the situations identified above, the Court of Appeal has no independent duty to review the record for reasonably arguable issues. If, after the appointed counsel finds there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal and so notifies defendant and defendant thereafter files no supplementary brief, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.
We bring this summary to the reader’s attention because there is a clear distinction the reader should appreciate between the first appeal as of right and appeals to a denial of post-conviction relief. The Wende rights do not continue to appeal of denials of post-conviction relief as in this case.
The citation for the Second Appellate District Court ruling discussed above is People v. Freddie Cole (2d App. Dist., 2020) 52 Cal. App. 5th 1023, 267 Cal. Rptr. 3d 113.
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