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We have never seen this misunderstanding reach the appellate court level until the recent (December 27, 2022) reported decision of People v. Matthew Douglas White, a case arising out of San Joaquin County and later appealed to the Third Appellate District.
In May 2006, then-25-year-old Matthew Douglas White, while drunk and speeding, hit a parked car stopped on the shoulder of the road with its hazard lights on, killing the driver and injuring two passengers.
A jury found White guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving while intoxicated, driving under the influence causing injury and driving with a blood alcohol content 0.08% or higher causing injury, with enhancements for causing and inflicting great bodily injury on multiple victims. He was also found guilty of driving on a suspended license, exhibition of speed and unsafe passing on the right.
The trial court sentenced White to 15 years to life for second degree murder and a consecutive determinate middle term of two years for driving under the influence with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher causing injury. The court also imposed but stayed the middle term of six years for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The conviction became final in 2012.
Eight years later, in 2020, White requested and received a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal. 4th 261 to make a record of information relevant to an eventual youth offender parole hearing.
After this, White filed a motion to vacate his sentence and remand for sentencing under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal. 2d 740 based on amendments to Penal Code § 654 based on the passage of Assembly Bill 518. The trial court denied this motion and White appealed to the Third Appellate District.
In White’s appeal, he argued that he is entitled to remand under AB 518 (wherein the trial court is no longer required to sentence defendant to the longest possible term of imprisonment when multiple offenses are based on the same act or omission) because the law applies to convictions that are not yet final. White then argued that the Franklin hearing “is a substantive hearing that reopens, unfinalizes and corrects the final sentence” because it was “necessary to cure the unconstitutionality of the prior sentence.”
The Third Appellate District disagreed. It cited to People v. Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 201, 207, which held that a Franklin hearing does not reopen a final judgment or sentence. Rather, it is an “evidence preservation process” to gather evidence for the eventual determination of parole, not a process to reopen or reconsider a sentence. In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal. 5th 439, 455.
Put another way, “a Franklin proceeding is unrelated to the validity of defendant’s sentence. Neither the entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation process disturbs the finality of state convictions.” In re Cook, supra, at 451.
It is to add reports, letters or other evidence to the defendant’s file to be considered by the parole board at the defendant’s youth offender parole hearing, during his or her 15th, 20th or 25th year of incarceration.
We present this summary because the Third Appellate District opinion validates our answer to so many calls suggesting the Franklin hearing is resentencing. It is not, as Mr. White was reminded.
The citation for the Third Appellate District Court ruling discussed above is People v. Matthew Douglas White (3rd App. Dist., 2022) 86 Cal. App. 5th 1229, 302 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863.
For more information about Franklin issues, please click on the following articles: