The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in James E. Synder v. United States that, under federal law, there is nothing illegal with a public official accepting a gratuity for a an official act after it is done (as a reward or token of appreciation), but that same official violates federal law if he or she “corruptly” solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act, meaning before the official act.
This ruling shocked many and led several commentators to quip that if a public officer is going to do something illegal in office, just delay payment until after it is done and everything’s OK.
Before this ruling, it is helpful to understand that the U.S. Congress established comprehensive prohibitions on both bribes and gratuities to federal officials. If a federal official accepts a bribe for an official act, federal bribery law at 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) provides for a 15-year maximum prison sentence. In contrast, if a federal official accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c).
In 1984, Congress passed and President Reagan signed a law now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666 that, as relevant to this case, extended the gratuities prohibition under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) t most state and local officials. Two years later, Congress reversed course and abolished the law to avoid the law’s “possible application to acceptable commercial and business practices.”
The law, as amended, made it a crime for any public official to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value” “intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with” any official business or transaction worth $5,000 or more. The crime carried with it a 10-year maximum prison sentence.
In 2013, James Snyder (now the former mayor of Portage, Indiana), while mayor, awarded two contracts to a local truck company,
Great Lakes Peterbilt, for five trash trucks from the company for about $1.1 million. In 2014, Peterbilt paid Snyder $13,000.
The FBI and federal prosecutors suspected that the payment was a gratuity for the City’s trash truck contracts.
Mr. Snyder said that the payment was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt.
A federal jury ultimately convicted Mr. Synder of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of Penal Code § 666(a)(1)(B). The District Court sentenced Mr. Snyder to one year and nine months in federal prison.
Mr. Snyder appealed, arguing that § 666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Mr. Synder’s conviction and so Mr. Synder appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed the Seventh Circuit.
The U.S. Supreme Court identified six reasons, which when taken together, led the Court to conclude that § 666 is a bribery only statute and not a gratuities statute, including the statute’s text, statutory history, statutory structure, statutory punishment, federalism and fair notice.
The Court first pointed out that the statutory text of § 666 requires an official to have a “corrupt state of mind and to accept (or agree to accept) a payment intending to be influenced in an official act, like 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). In other words, the Court found, it is bribery statute, not a gratuities statute. In the parallel gratuities statute, no mens rea is required.
The Court then found that the statutory history of the legislation behind § 666 “reinforces that result” because, when enacted, § 666 borrowed text from 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) when it was amended.
Third, statutory structure also reinforces that it is a bribery statute, not a “two-for-one” (bribery and gratuities) statute as the Government argued. After all, bribery and gratuities are “two separate crimes” with “two different sets of elements.” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal. (1999) 526 U.S. 398, 404.
Fourth, Congress separated bribery and gratuities by placing them in different sections and set forth different punishments for each that reflect their relative seriousness. Bribery can be punished with up to 15 years in federal prison (ten years for state and local officials); gratuities two years.
Fifth, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out, interpreting § 666 would infringe upon “bedrock federalism principles” and violate the states’ individual rights to regulate permissible interactions between state officials and their constituents. Otherwise, applying § 666 to state and local officials would suddenly subject nineteen million state and local officials to a new and different federal statutory scheme for gratuities.
Lastly, the U.S. Supreme Court would “create traps for unwary state and local officials. would have to guess what gifts they are allowed to accept under federal law with the threat that if they guess wrong, they face up to ten years in federal prison, although they could accept such gifts under state law. The wiser alternative is to defer to state governments to govern this area of conduct and not the federal government.
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed Mr. Synder’s conviction, agreeing with him that § 666 did not apply to gratuities.
We applaud the Supreme Court for this ruling, as it is logical and fixes the otherwise overlapping federal and state laws in this area of government official conduct.