Absolute and Limited Immunity Defenses in 1983 Case

Prison officials and staff may have many defenses to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case.  Such defenses can generally be divided into factual defenses and legal defenses. 

A defendant might raise a factual defense that they simply did not do what the plaintiff says was done.  Alternatively, a defendant might admit doing the action, but contend that it was not done with the state of mind necessary for a constitutional violation.  The truth of a factual defense is decided by the trier of fact, which is either a jury or a judge.

Defendants may also raise legal defenses.  These include arguments that the defendant failed to exhaust administrative remedies or did not meet a filing deadline related to a statute of limitations.  Defendants also frequently assert that the plaintiff has failed to make a claim that is specific enough or that even if the plaintiff's factual claims are true, no federal right was violated or, in other words, that the plaintiff has “failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  

There are also defenses of absolute immunity and qualified immunity. Defendants usually raise their legal defenses in a pre-trial motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, which will be decided by the judge overseeing the case.  

Although prison officials sometimes try to contend that they cannot accommodate people’s rights due to financial constraints, lack of funds generally is not a valid defense. Jackson v. Bishop (8th Cir. 1968) 404 F. 2d 571, 580; Gates v. Collier (5th Cir. 1974) 501 F. 2d 1291, 1320; Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 908, 920-921, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405; but see Peralta v. Dillard (9th Cir. 2014) 744 F. 3d 1076 (medical provider cannot be held personally liable for deliberate indifference to person’s serious medical needs if he could not render the needed services because of a lack of resources he could not change).

Many state officials in fact have absolute immunity under the U.S Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment from being sued in an “individual capacity” for money damages for acts performed as part of their official duties.  This means that a plaintiff cannot win money damages even if the official’s action violated federal law.  However, such officials do not have absolute immunity against lawsuits seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief against them in their “official capacity.” Kentucky v. Graham (1985) 473 U.S. 159, 166,105 S. Ct. 3099; 87 L. Ed. 2d 114; Thornton v. Brown (9th Cir. 2014) 757 F. 3d 834; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates (9th Cir. 1993) 995 F. 2d 1469, 1472; American Fire, Theft and Collision Managers v. Gillespie (9th Cir. 1991) 932 F. 2d 816, 818.

For example, judges cannot be held liable in § 1983 actions for money damages, for acts performed as part of their official duties. Stump v. Sparkman (1978) 435 U.S. 349, 359, 99 S. Ct. 1099; 55 L. Ed. 2d 331; Pierson v. Ray (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 564, 87 S. Ct. 1213; 18 L. Ed. 2d 288; Sadoski v. Mosley (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F. 3d 1076, 1079.

Prosecutors and the state attorney general are immune for acts or failures to act as part of a judicial process, but they are not immune from suit in regard to some activities that are strictly investigative or administrative. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein (2009) 555 U.S. 335, 344, 129 S. Ct. 855; 172 L. Ed. 2d 706; Cousins v. Lockyer (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F. 3d 1063, 1071-1072; see also Brown v. California Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F. 3d 747, 751 (prosecutor immune from suit for recommending denial of parole).

Law enforcement officers and other government agents unfortunately (we think) have absolute immunity for their testimony in a judicial proceeding, and cannot be sued for false or misleading testimony. Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 825, 97 S. Ct. 1491; 52 L. Ed. 2d 72; Wright v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1987) 642 F. 2d 1129, 1134.

Parole board commissioners cannot be held liable in § 1983 actions for money damages for acts performed as part of their official duties, such as decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole. Brown v. California Dept. of Corrections (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F. 3d 747, 751; Sellars v. Procunier (9th Cir. 1981) 641 F. 2d 1295, 1302.   Similarly, the Governor has absolute immunity for reversing a grant of parole. Miller v. Davis (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F. 3d 1142, 1145.

Prison officials are absolutely immune from lawsuits for enforcing sentences imposed by the courts. Engebretson v. Mahoney (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F. 3d 1034, 1039.  However, prison officials and correctional officers generally do not have absolute immunity for other types of actions. Procunier v. Navarette (1978) 434 U.S. 555, 561, 98 S. Ct. 855; 55 L. Ed. 2d 24.  This is so even when they serve in the role of adjudicators, such as being hearing officers in prison disciplinary cases. Cleavinger v. Saxner (1985) 474 U.S. 193, 203-204, 106 S. Ct. 496; 88 L. Ed. 2d 507.

Parole agents have absolute immunity for imposing parole conditions and for initiating revocation proceedings, but they are not absolutely immune in regard to law enforcement functions like investigating parole violations, arresting parolees or initiating parole holds. Swift v. California (9th Cir. 2004) 384 F. 3d 1184, 1189, 1191; Thornton v. Brown (9th Cir. 2014) 757 F. 3d 834, 839-840.

While this article appears on our website, it would be a mistake to give us credit for its contents.  Most of the content is from the California Prison and Parole Law Handbook by the Prison Law Office in Folsom, California, who we must acknowledge and thank for their wonderful treatise.