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What is the Statute of Limitations on a § 1983 Action?
The answer to the rhetorical question posed in the title to this article is it matters.
The law of the state where the issue occurred sets the baseline for how soon a person must file the case after the cause of action accrues, as § 1983 itself does not include any particular time limits. Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S. Ct. 1938; 85 L. Ed.2d 254; Vaghan v. Grijalva (9th Cir. 1991) 927 F. 2d 476, 479.
In California, a person has two years to file a personal injury lawsuit; this is the statute of limitations that applies in most § 1983 cases. Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1 (effective Jan. 1, 2003).
However, there are a few important exceptions. A three-year statute of limitations applies to cases claiming violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA; 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.). Sharkey v. O’Neal (9th Cir. 2015) 778 F. 3d 767, 773.
Claims of infringements on religious rights in violation of RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act) have a four-year statute of limitations. Pouncil v. Tilton (9th Cir. 2012) 704 F. 3d 568, 573.
More fundamentally, however, it is important to understand that a federal civil rights suit must be brought within a certain period of time after the cause of action “accrues.” This means that the timeline for filing a federal civil rights suit will begin on the date of the event that caused the injury or the date the person learns that they have an injury. Bagley v. CMC Real Estate Corp. (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F. 2d 758, 760; see also Knox v. Davis (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F. 3d 1009, 1013 (letter from prison administration formally withdrawing visitation and mail privileges started the statute of limitations for filing § 1983 action; each subsequent denial of an attempt to visit or send mail did not create a new cause of action or re-start the timeline); compare with Pouncil v. Tilton (9th Cir. 2012) 704 F. 3d 568, 581-583 (person was denied conjugal visits in 2002, reapplied in 2008 after re-marrying, was denied again, then filed § 1983 lawsuit challenging the 2008 denial; 2008 denial was discrete, independently wrongful act that triggered a new period of limitations).
In a case alleging unlawful arrest with lack of probable cause, the time limit begins running from the date the person is first arraigned in front of a judicial officer. Wallace v. Kato (2007) 549 U.S. 384, 390, 127 S. Ct. 1091; 166 L. Ed. 2d 973.
In a case arising from an improper conviction or sentence, parole revocation, or disciplinary credit loss — which must normally first be deemed invalid on direct appeal or habeas corpus — the timeline for a § 1983 suit will begin running from the date the sentence, parole revocation, or credit loss, is deemed invalid. Edwards v. Balisok (1997) 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S. Ct. 1584; 137 L. Ed. 2d 906; Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 489-490, 114 S. Ct. 2364; 129 L. Ed. 2d 383].
However, the law recognizes that it is difficult for people in prison to exhaust administrative remedies, get legal information, hire a lawyer or prepare legal documents within the normal time period for filing a § 1983 lawsuit. Thus, there are many situations in which the statute of limitations is “tolled,” meaning the clock does not start or will pause for a period of time. Tolling is governed by the law of the state where the claim accrued. Donoghue v. Orange County (9th Cir. 1987) 848 F. 2d 926, 930.
Because of tolling provisions, many people in prison have more than two years in which to file their § 1983 lawsuits. A person should explain any reasons why time should be tolled when they file his or her lawsuit.
Tolling occurs in the following circumstances:
- Time is tolled while a person exhausts administrative remedies as required by the PLRA. Brown v. Valoff (9th Cir. 2005) 422 F. 3d 926, 942-943
- Time is tolled while a person brings a direct appeal or habeas corpus challenges to a criminal sentence, loss of credits or denial or revocation of parole, if required by the Heck rule. Marsh v. San Diego County (S.D. Cal. 2006) 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1055-1056.
- “Equitable tolling” can stop the statute of limitations clock where it is in the interests of justice, the plaintiff has acted reasonably, the defendants have adequate notice of the claim, and tolling would not cause prejudice to the defendants. Jones v. Blanas (9th Cir. 2004) 393 F. 3d 918, 928. It can be difficult to convince a court to apply equitable tolling. See Wade v. Ratella (S.D. Cal. 2005) 407 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1205-1206; Fink v. Shedler (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 91.
- Time is automatically tolled for up to two years if a person is suing for money damages and is imprisoned for a determinate term or a term of life with the possibility of parole; this tolling period ends early if the person is released before the two-year period expires. Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1; Martinez v. Gomez (9th Cir. 1998) 137 F. 3d 1124, 1126 (tolling provision applies to people serving life with the possibility of parole). Automatic tolling for being imprisoned does not apply to people in custody for civil commitments, such as people with SVP commitments; however, equitable tolling may apply if the civil commitment causes similar difficulties in pursuing legal rights. Jones v. Blanas (2004) 393 F. 3d 918, 928-930.
- The statute of limitations will not start to run if the plaintiff is a minor or is deemed insane when the cause of action occurred. The time limits will begin running only when the person becomes an adult or regains sanity. Code of Civil Procedure § 352; City of Huntington Park v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1300, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68.
Although the law seems to prohibit tolling for people serving Life Without the Possibility of Parole (LWOP) or death sentences, some courts have granted tolling in such cases. Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1 (tolling due to imprisonment applies to people serving a "term less than for life"); compare Allen v. Barnes (9th Cir 2000) 243 F. 3d 546 (unpublished order granting tolling to person with LWOP sentence both for pre-sentence time and time after LWOP sentence imposed) with Boggs v. Treadway (9th Cir. 1991) 172 F. 3d 875 (unpublished order refusing to allow tolling after LWOP sentence imposed); see also Ayers v. Ayala (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2011) No. C10–0979, Order (granting tolling to person who serving death sentence).
Nonetheless, a person who is unsure whether tolling applies should assume time is not tolled. The tolling period for imprisonment does not apply to lawsuits that are for injunctive or declaratory relief (Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1(c)) or to any state tort claims that are joined with the federal §1983 claims. Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1(b); Ellis v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 1999) 176 F. 3d 1183, 1190.
While this article appears on our website, it would be a mistake to attribute the majority of its contents to Greg Hill & Associates. Credit instead is due to the Prison Law Office in Folsom, CA and their wonderful treatise, California Prison and Parole Law Handbook, which this article is largely based upon.
