What a § 1983 Civil Rights Action Cannot Address

From the outset of this article, we wish to make clear that Greg Hill & Associates does not file civil lawsuits for 1983 cases.  However, the topic inevitably arises in discussions with clients about prison conditions, parole decisions and other situations involving our criminal justice system, so we offer this article to help our clients and potential clients.

For example, it merits mention that a person cannot use a § 1983 lawsuit to seek injunctive relief or release due to an unlawful criminal conviction or sentence.  Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 475, 489, 93 S. Ct. 1827; 36 L. Ed. 2d 439.  Instead, an appeal, writ of mandate or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus would be the more appropriate method of addressing this.

In addition, although a § 1983 suit can be filed to seek money damages due to an invalid conviction or sentence, such a suit can only be filed after a criminal conviction is declared invalid in a direct appeal, habeas corpus proceeding or other court action. This is called the “Heck rule.” Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364; 129 L. Ed.2d 383; see also Jackson v. Barnes (9th Cir. 2014) 749 F. 3d 755, 759 (Heck rule did not bar § 1983 claim following overturned conviction, even though the person was later successfully prosecuted in the same case).  If a § 1983 suit clearly is intended to state a habeas claim, a court may treat the complaint as a habeas petition or may dismiss it. Guerrero v. Gates (9th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 697, 703. 

Complicated issues concerning the Heck rule sometimes arise when people file § 1983 lawsuits seeking damages for use of excessive force at the time of a criminal arrest or prison rule violation incident.  A person convicted or found guilty of a rule violation for resisting or obstructing a peace officer cannot seek damages (under either § 1983 or state tort law) for an officer's use of excessive force during the incident unless the conviction or disciplinary violation is first overturned on direct appeal or habeas corpus, because a person is guilty of resisting or obstructing an officer only if the officer was acting lawfully. Susag v. Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1408, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269; see also Cunningham v. Gates (9th Cir. 2003) 312 F. 3d 1148, 1153 (civil rights claims for excessive force barred because claims imply invalidity of criminal conviction resulting from gunfight with police); Truong v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept. (2005) 129 Cal. App.4th 1423, 1427, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 450 (same).

Also, a damages action for excessive force is not barred if the excessive force was used after the conduct on which the conviction or rule violation was based (Smith v. City of Hemet (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F. 3d 689, 698; Sanford v. Motts (9th Cir. 2001) 258 F. 3d 1117, 1119; Kyles v. Baker (N.D. Cal. 2014) 72 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1035-1037).

  

A 1983 action also may be brought if use of deadly force was not a reasonable response to the person’s actions. Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 885, 898-900, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 787.

These rules also apply to civil commitments, such as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) commitment. Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F. 3d 1136, 1140. 

In addition, the same rules bar use of § 1983 action for prison or parole issues that affect the length of a sentence, such as challenges to denial or forfeiture of sentence credits or to revocation or denial of parole. Edwards v. Balisok (1997) 520 U.S. 641, 643, 117 S. Ct. 1584; 137 L. Ed. 2d 906 (applying bar in case seeking to invalidate a prison disciplinary procedure that resulted in loss of good conduct credits); Young v. Kenny (9th Cir. 1990) 907 F. 2d 874, 875 (applying bar to claim that prison officials improperly failed to apply jail time credits to prison sentence); Hawkins v. Risley (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F. 2d 321, 325 (denial of federal habeas challenge to state’s revocation of work furlough barred § 1983 suit on challenging that revocation); Barela v. Variz (S.D. Cal. 1999) 36 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1256 (applying bar to challenge to prison job supervisor’s decision to deduct credits for days of work missed); Robinson v. Board of Prison Terms (C.D. Cal. 1998) 997 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (bar applied to person with life sentence’s challenging to denial of parole).

These bars apply only to issues that necessarily affect the length of incarceration.  In other words, a person can still bring a federal civil rights case if winning the issue would not necessarily invalidate the underlying custody or decrease the time in custody.  

Applying this principle, courts have allowed § 1983 cases in a variety of criminal case related matters. Osborne v. District Attorney (9th Cir. 2005) 423 F. 3d 1050, 1053 (person may bring federal civil rights action to compel the state to release evidence needed for investigation); Weilburg v. Shapiro (9th Cir. 2007) 488 F. 3d 1202, 1206 (suit alleging extradition law violations does not necessarily imply invalidity of the criminal conviction); Wilkerson v. Wheeler (9th Cir. 2014) 772 F. 3d 834, 836 (excessive force in restraining person); Shoemaker v. Harris (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (implying person could use federal civil rights action to challenge sex offender registration requirement]; Lockett v. Ericson (9th Cir. 2011) 656 F. 3d 892 (person convicted by no contest plea can bring civil rights suit challenging an illegal search without first invalidating the conviction; since the illegally seized material was not used as evidence in a trial, any finding that the seizure was illegal will not invalidate the conviction).

Some challenges to administrative segregation or filing of disciplinary charges may also fall into this category. Muhammad v. Close (2004) 540 U.S. 749, 754, 124 S. Ct. 1303; 158 L. Ed. 2d 32 (allowing § 1983 suit where person alleged that officer filed retaliatory disciplinary charges, which would not affect the time being served); Ramirez v. Galaza (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F. 3d 850, 856 (allowing § 1983 suit for due process and equal protection challenge to disciplinary procedures and administrative segregation placement that would not necessarily result in earlier release from prison); Thomas v. Eby (6th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 434, 438-440; York v. Huerta-Garcia (S.D. Cal. 1999) 36 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1238.

Similarly, a § 1983 suit can be brought concerning parole suitability policies or parole conditions, if the matters could be addressed without invalidating the underlying criminal conviction or shortening the time spent in prison or on parole. Wilkinson v. Dotson (2005) 544 U.S. 74, 78, 125 S. Ct. 1242; 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (people with life sentences could bring § 1983 suit challenging application of new, harsher guidelines for determining parole suitability, where the people with life sentences were not seeking injunctions ordering speedier or immediate release); Thornton v. Brown (9th Cir. 2014) 757 F. 3d 834, 840-845 (person on parole could use § 1983 suit to challenge residence and GPS requirements for people with sex offenses).

While this article appears on our website, it would be a mistake to attribute authorship to Greg Hill & Associates.  We liberally brought a lot of the information from the The California Prison and Parole Law Handbook, authored by the Prison Law Office in Folsom, CA, to whom we owe many thanks.