PC 17(b) Relief on 664-288.4 Doesn’t End 290 Reporting

The following summary of People v. Junaid Manzoor, a recent California Court of Appeal ruling from the First District Court, is the first we know of that addresses Senate Bill 384’s tier level provisions. 

Earlier, there was a reported decision, People v. Sonny Kim Thai, from the Fourth Appellate District, which addressed terminating registration in light of public safety concerns.

In 2006, Mr. Manzoor pleaded guilty in Contra Costa Superior Court to a felony violation of Penal Code §§ 288.2(b) / 664(a), also known as attempted distribution of harmful material to a minor.

As part of his plea bargain, the prosecution dismissed another count in which it was alleged that Mr. Mansoor attempted to commit a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 in violation of Penal Code §§ 288(a) / 664.  Mr. Mansoor was then placed on three years of formal probation and was required to serve 90 days in county jail.  As a result of his conviction, Mr. Mansoor was required to register for life as a sex offender under Penal Code § 290.

Approximately 14 years later, Mr. Mansoor filed a petition to reduce his 288.2 / 664 conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor under Penal Code § 17(b)(3), which the trial court granted.  The trial court also granted relief under Penal Code § 1203.4 (“expungement”).

In 2020, Senate Bill No. 384 was passed into law, providing a tiered system of registration time periods.

In 2021, Mr. Mansoor filed a petition for relief from the sex offender registration requirements in the Alameda County Superior Court, where he resided and was required to register.  He argued that under the recent amendments to Penal Code § 290, the current version of the statute “provides no obligation to register for those convicted of misdemeanor Penal Code § 288.2,” even though a felony conviction of section 288.2 was a “tier three” offense subject to lifetime registration and thus he “stands with those for whom registration is imposed for no listed offense under section 290.006.” 

He further contended that section 290.006 in turn, provided that “such registrants are placed in tier 1 ([registration for] ten years) unless otherwise directed by the sentencing court.”  Therefore, he argued, he was eligible for relief from registration based on his placement in tier one, which he asserted had taken place by operation of law once his offense was reduced to a misdemeanor.

The local law enforcement agency submitted the “sex offender checklist” form in response to Mr. Manzoor’s SB 384 petition and in it, stated that Mr. Mansoor was subject to a“[l]ifetime mandatory registration period.”

The prosecutor in Alameda County filed an opposition to Mr. Mansoor’s petition, arguing that it should be denied because he did not qualify for termination as a “lifetime registrant” in “[t]ier 3” and did not fall under the “risk-level exception.”

In February, 2022, the trial court denied Mr. Mansoor’s petition, finding that Mr. Mansoor did not qualify for relief from the sex offender registration requirements because he was a lifetime registrant.

Mr. Mansoor then appealed to the First Appellate District Court in San Francisco.  The First Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling, explaining that the Sex Offender Registration Act requires lifetime registration for defendants convicted of certain offenses, including Penal Code § 288.2.  Under Penal Code § 290(d)(3)(C)(x), a person is a tier three offender subject to lifetime registration if “[t]he person was convicted of violating . . . Section 288.2.

Furthermore, a judge is not authorized “to relieve a defendant of the duty to register as a sex offender pursuant to Section 290 if the defendant is charged with an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to Section 290, and for which the trier of fact has found the defendant guilty.” Penal Code § 17(e). 

Thus, the reduction of Mr. Mansoor’s felony violation of 288.2 to a misdemeanor did not affect Mr. Mansoor’s lifetime duty to register as a sex offender based on Penal Code § 17(e)’s plain language.  Furthermore, Mr. Mansoor presented no evidence that amendments to Section 290 reflected a legislative intent to relieve a defendant of their lifetime registration obligation.