Motion to Suppress Handgun Improperly Denied

In reviewing the many reported decisions concerning motions to suppress evidence discovered by police without a warrant, particularly from a car, one may wonder if the exceptions to a warrant have made the Fourth Amendment meaningless.

The following summary of a Third Appellate District Court case, Jameal M. Mosley v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, may restore one’s faith in the Fourth Amendment and our courts. 

On July 5, 2023, the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department received a phone call about a group of men in a parking lot of a Rando Cordova apartment complex.  The called explained that the men appeared to be making a music video and one, who the caller described as thin, age 16 or 17 and wearing all black clothing, was holding a handgun. 

Police from the Gang Suppression Unit went to the location, arriving at 8:12 p.m.  The apartment complex was within the territory controlled by the East Side Pirus gang.  Police then detained Jameal M. Mosley, who was heavyset, full grown and partially dressed in black.  They then handcuffed Mr. Mosley.  One of the police officers stated he recognized Mr. Mosley from the Known Persons Filed database as a validated member of the East Side Pirus and that Mr. Mosley had a history of firearms arrests.

One of the juvenile present took off running, but was apprehended quickly.  Police found he was carrying a firearm.  

After learning that Mr. Mosley had driven himself to the apartment complex in his wife’s car, police asked to search that car that he drove to the location.  Mr. Mosley said no. 

Despite this, police searched his vehicle without a warrant and found a loaded magazine and an automatic Glock handgun.  He had been detained for 41 minutes at this point.

Mr. Mosley was then charged with possession and transportation of a machine gun (Penal Code § 32625(a)), being a felon in possession of a firearm for the benefit of a street gang (Penal Code §§ 29800(a)(1), 186.22(b)(1)) and being a felon in possession of ammunition (Penal Code § 30305(a)(1)).  The complaint further alleged that Mr. Mosley had suffered a prior strike conviction (Penal Code §§ 667(b) – (i), 1170.12).

Mr. Mosley moved to suppress the evidence found in his car, but the trial court judge denied the motion, finding there had been probable cause to search.

Mr. Mosely then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to the Third Appellate District Court in Sacramento, which granted the petition.  The Third Appellate District Court first explained that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, “subject to only a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”  Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357.

When a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search, “the prosecution bears the burden to prove that police conducted the search under a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.”  People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal. App. 4th 746, 756.  “The prosecution always bears the burden of justifying, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a warrantless search or seizure falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal. App. 5th 1146, 1152.

The appellate court then explained that officers may only conduct a warrantless search of a car if there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.  Florida v. Harris (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 244.  The automobile exception applies to unoccupied, parked cars.  People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 85, 98 – 101.

The appellate court then explained that there was probable cause to detain or arrest Mr. Mosley because he was a known, validated gang member, he was present in an are known for gang activity and he was present for the filming of a music video, a medium said to convey messages of dominance and power to rival gangs.

However, there was insufficient cause to search his wife’s car without a warrant.  Probable cause to search is different from probable cause to detain insofar as police must consider the location of the area to search and whether there is reasonable suspicion that it contains evidence of a crime.  Police argued that Mr. Mosley could have had time to hide evidence in his car.  The appellate court discounted this because Mr. Mosley did not know the police were on their way.  Moreover, he really did not fit the description of the man with a gun because he was not thin and he was not wearing all black.

Therefore, the appellate court ordered that the trial court vacate its order denying Mr. Mosley’s motion to suppress and enter a new order granting the motion.