Continued Civil Commitment under WIC 6500, Sex Crime

California Welfare & Institutions Code § 6500 permits the involuntary commitment of persons with a developmental disability if they are found to be “a danger to self or others.” 

As one can imagine, this imposes a purgatory of sorts on those so committed, although each new commitment order expires at the anniversary of the date of the prior commitment order.  People v. Nolasco (2021) 67 Cal. App. 5th 209, 218.  When the prior order expires, there is a recurring issue of due process concerning the sufficiency of evidence supporting a continued commitment, particularly when the committed person has remained committed for many years.

The commitment case of G.A. exemplifies this due process issue, as he argued that he could not be committed if he did not violate any law or commit any overt act during the commitment period, so he should be released.  In other words, the evidence was insufficient to support his continued commitment.

When his commitment was extended by one more year, he appealed the order to California Court of Appeal for the First District.

G.A. never regained competency, but he returned to the city where his parents lived and received services through the Redwood Coast Regional Center until 2008.

In February 2010, the People filed a felony complaint charging G.A. with kidnapping with the intent to sexually assault, rape, annoy or molest a child under the age of 10 years (Penal Code § 209(b), and sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child under the age of 10 years (Penal Code § 288.7(a). 

After finding G.A. incompetent to stand trial, the trial court held a commitment hearing pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code § 6500.  At that hearing G.A. stipulated to the evidence and made no argument that the evidence failed to satisfy any constitutional or statutory requirements for commitment.

Over the years, up until the commitment petition filed in 2020, G.A. submitted to various reports being submitted and impliedly agreed with the extension of his commitment.  In 2020, he challenged his commitment, but his appeal was deemed moot.

In August 2021, the People filed a petition to again extend G.A.’s commitment.  The People alleged that G.A. suffers from moderate developmental disability that represents a danger to himself and others and that he was charged with the aforementioned sex offenses in 2010.

A court trial on the petition was held in 2021.  Several witnesses were called by the People to describe G.A.’s developmental disabilities with examples of his conduct over the years.  A doctor who had evaluated G.A. over eight times explained that his I.Q. was measured at 42 and explained that he was very significantly impaired and has a “moderate intellectual disability” and that he is “very impulsive” due to various cognitive limitations and emotional factors.

The court then recommitted G.A.

G.A. appealed, arguing that no witness testified concerning any recent “overt act” and that therefore, his due process rights were violated because his continued commitment was based on nothing more than evaluations by a doctor and a social worker who generally just explained that he is of low intelligence and poor communication skills.

G.A. contended the requirement of recent overt act was supported by In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal. 4th 1251.  In Smith, the California Supreme Court contrasted commitments under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act) with involuntary commitment procedures and one-year conservatorships for people with mental illnesses under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (Welfare & Institutions Code § 5000 et seq).  “Under the SVP Act, those currently in prison with the requisite convictions for sexually violent offenses can be subject to continued civil commitment solely on the basis of findings that an individual has a mental disorder that makes it likely he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.”

“On the other hand, those not in prison, including those who also have prior convictions for sexually violent offenses, can be subject to long-term civil commitment (under the LPS Act) only when . . . they are determined to be gravely disabled or to have a mental disorder and to be a danger to self and others as show by recent acts.” Smith at p. 1268.  In G.A.’s view, this passage supported a general requirement for proof of a recent overt act of dangerousness in cases where a criminal conviction or probable cause finding is lacking.

The First Appellate District disagreed, explaining that continued commitment can be proper when the person at issue is gravely disabled without proof of a recent overt act.  Here, the testimony about G.A. showed he was gravely disabled, so his commitment order challenge was dismissed.