Can Judge Consider State of Mind in Strict Liability?

One of the judicial officers who we admire most is Commissioner H. Elizabeth Harris, who has a no-nonsense personality, takes the bench at 8:30 a.m. every day (a rarity in criminal courts) and treats misdemeanor defendants with guarded respect.  She has been a judicial officer for twenty years and is now in her early eighties, but mentally sharp as ever.  She is African American.

It was with no small amount of satisfaction that we read that the California Supreme Court recently affirmed her in a misdemeanor matter wherein defendant Emily Wheeler, age 85, was charged with violating § 104.15(a)(1) of the Los Angeles City Code (“Unlicensed Commercial Cannabis / Collective Activity”) arising out of her ownership of a building leased to a company that set up shop as a marijuana dispensary without a city license.

The Los Angeles City Attorney’s office also alleged that Ms. Wheeler and her son, the property owners, violated Los Angeles City Code §§ 104.15(b)(4) (“renting, leasing or otherwise allow an establishment to engage in unlawful commercial cannabis activity without the business having a license or temporary permit) and12.21(a)(1)(A) (“unlawfully erect, alter, enlarge, move and maintain a building . . . without securing the necessary permits and licenses as required by all laws and ordinances”).

In other words, they leased the property to a marijuana business that was not properly permitted.  These offenses are all “strict liability” offenses wherein proving the intent of defendant is not required by the prosecutor to reach a conviction.  

Ms. Wheeler’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the municipal code sections were vague and overbroad.  The motion invited the judge to dismiss the action on its own motion under Penal Code § 1385 “in the furtherance of justice.”  The motion explained that Ms. Wheler was 85 years old and had no prior criminal history and was merely the property owner.  It argued that she had no connection with the operation of the business and the tenant had in fact deceived her by operating its business without her knowledge or consent.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Ms. Wheeler came to court in her wheelchair.

The People did not dispute the contention that Ms. Wheeler was unaware of the marijuana activity.  It was also established at the hearing that Ms. Wheeler had no connection to the tenant, but for her ownership of the land and the building.

Commissioner Harris denied Ms. Wheeler’s motion to dismiss, but then immediately granted its own motion under 1385.  Commissioner Harris explained her reasoning, citing to Ms. Wheeler’s age, lack of record and complete lack of personal knowledge of the illegality of the marijuana business.

The appellate division of the superior court reversed, finding that Commissioner Harris’ sua sponte dismissal amounted to “disagreement with the law” or a “disapproval of the impact of the law” on Ms. Wheeler by considering her mental state in a crime that required no mental state to be proven.

The California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District affirmed.

Ms. Wheeler did not give up and appealed this ruling to the California Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court reversed in Ms. Wheeler’s favor.  It did so by concluding that a trial court has broad inherent authority under Penal Code § 1385 to dismiss any action in which the legislative has not evidenced a contrary intent.  The only limitation is that the dismissal must be in the interest of justice, which requires a balancing of the constitutional rights of the defendant with the interests of society as represented by the People.  Such a dismissal, for example, cannot be for a judge’s idiosyncratic view of “moral justice” to be elevated above the legislature’s intent.

The Supreme Cour then looked closely at the municipal code sections charged and explained how each one provided for a wide variety of punishment, from noncriminal sanctions up to misdemeanor charges.  This, they explained, meant the Legislature contemplated a wide variety of offenders, from more culpable to less culpable.

Ms. Wheeler, the Supreme Court stated, would fall on the far end of the less culpable offenders given her background and total lack of knowing or willful conduct.  Yet she faced the most serious potential for punishment – six months in Los Angeles County Jail.

Therefore, it was not Commissioner Harris’ antipathy toward the law that motivated her dismissal under Penal Code § 1385, but her consideration of the character of the charges themselves.  Under these circumstances, a dismissal was in furtherance of the interest of justice.

We offer this summary because it is refreshing to see someone we admire be affirmed.  Commissioner Harris made a gutsy decision to dismiss charges and she was vindicated.