Under 1172.6 Resentencing, New Sentence Enhancement?

California Penal Code § 1172.6 codifies Senate Bill No. 1437, which changed California’s felony murder rule.  1172.6 provides an opportunity for criminal defendants who were convicted of murder under either a natural and probable consequences theory or (in some circumstances) under a felony-murder theory – and who could not be convicted of the law as it currently stands – to file a petition to be resentenced.

A successful petitioner, meaning one who the judge agrees must be resentenced because petitioner could not now be convicted of the law as it is currently, is then entitled to have the murder “conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction” vacated and to be “resentenced on the remaining charges.” Penal Code § 1172.6(d)(3).

However, a successful petitioner who was charged with murder “generically, and the target offense [i.e., robbery, burglary, etc.] was not charged” is entitled to have the murder conviction “redesignated” as the “target offense” of the natural and probable consequences theory – or the “underlying felony,” i.e., robbery, burglary, or some other crime, of the felony murder and be resentenced accordingly. 

 

In January 1992 in Santa Clara County, J. Sacramento Benitez was killed during a residential burglary and attempted robbery.  The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Luis Ramon Manzano Arellano and two codefendants, Arturo Mendoza and Jesus Antonio Mandujano, with Mr. Benitez’s murder, attempted robbery, and first degree burglary.

The murder and attempted robbery counts further alleged that each defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of those offenses (Penal Code §§ 1203.06, 12022.5(a)).

Prior to the preliminary hearing, Mr. Arellano agreed to plead guilty to second degree murder under certain conditions, including that the firearm use enhancement would be stricken and the robbery and burglary charges dismissed.  The judge then sentenced Mr. Arellano to 15 years to life, concurrent to a sentence previously imposed in a different case, and dismissed the robbery and burglary counts as well as the firearm enhancement.  

In October 2020, Mr. Arellano, through counsel, filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code § 1172.6.  The People stipulated that Mr. Arellano was eligible for resentencing and in light of this, the judge vacated Mr. Arellano’s murder conviction, stayed execution of that vacatur pending resentencing, and set the matter for further proceedings to redesignate the charge or charges upon which Mr. Arellano would be resentenced.

At the further proceeding, Mr. Arellano argued that should be redesignated as the underlying residential burglary and attempted robbery for resentencing purposes and he objected to adding enhancements that were not previously admitted or found true by a trier of fact. 

The trial court disagreed, reasoning it had the authority to impose the previously dismissed enhancement and find there was “evidence in the record” to “suggest” Mr. Arellano was armed.  

Mr. Arellano appealed this ruling to the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth District in San Jose and it agreed with Mr. Arellano, reversing and remanding the matter, finding the judge erred by including the firearm enhancement.  

The People then appealed this order to the California Supreme Court, which affirmed the Sixth District and agreed with Mr. Arellano. 

 The California Supreme Court, in People v. Luis Ramon Manzano Arellano, explained that nothing in the text of Penal Code § 1172.6 indicates that a judge may add uncharged and unproven enhancements.  To the contrary, under § 1172.6(d)(3), a court must vacate “any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction.”  Reviewing the text, structure and purpose of the statute, the California Supreme Court held that judges may not impose uncharged and unproven allegations or enhancements as part of resentencing.  

We regard this ruling as straightforward and clear, but understand how the trial court arrived at what it did.  We find that many judges and prosecutors consider SB 1437, codified at 1172.6, as a windfall for certain defendant.  They dislike seeing defendants resentenced to time served and released, so they try to prevent this, as the judge did in this case.