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Three Reasons a Habeas May Not Be Brought & Exceptions
There are three main procedural rules limiting the use of state habeas corpus to challenge criminal judgments, as well as some exceptions to those rules.
First, as a general rule, a state petition for writ of habeas corpus cannot substitute for a direct appeal. This means that a habeas petition usually cannot be filed on issues that could have been (but were not) argued based solely on the information in the trial court record and raised in a direct appeal from the conviction, civil commitment, or revocation proceeding. In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 813, 829, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal. 2d 756.
Note that this does not bar a petitioner from raising ineffective assistance by trial or appellate counsel in failing to object to errors, make motions, investigate facts, present evidence, or make legal arguments, as ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) is a new independent issue that requires introduction of additional information about trial counsel’s deficiencies and any reasons for their actions. Harris, supra, at 832-835.
Second, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot act as a second appeal by raising the same issues that were previously argued and rejected in a direct appeal. In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 428, 476-477, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297; Harris, supra, at 824-829; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 218, 225, 42 Cal. Rptr. 9. Such a petition would be barred by principals of res judicata.
Third, a petitioner who loses a habeas case cannot file another habeas petition raising the same legal issue based on the same facts. In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 769, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509. Such a petition would be barred by principals of collateral estoppel.
Courts may make exceptions to these procedural bars. The four established exceptions are that a habeas corpus action may still be brought if:
- the issue constitutes a fundamental constitutional error, “where the claimed constitutional error is both clear and fundamental, and strikes at the heart of the trial process.” Such errors are akin to “structural errors” for which automatic reversal is required in criminal appeal cases (see Reno, supra, at 478; Harris, supra at 829-838; see also Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S. Ct. 1246; 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (discussing standard for structural errors));
- the conviction or sentence was rendered by a court lacking fundamental jurisdiction, meaning the court simply did not have the authority to decide the case (see In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 992, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706 (court had no jurisdiction to sentence on probation violation due to probation officer’s failure to notify the court within 30 days of receiving Penal Code § 1203.2a demand for sentencing);
- the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, such as entering a conviction or selecting a sentence that is not authorized by the law; there are many potential legal bases for arguing that a conviction or sentence was unauthorized. Examples of unauthorized convictions or sentences include In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal. 3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual); In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal. 3d 612 108 Cal. Rptr. 465 (given undisputed facts, conviction unauthorized because the law did not prohibit the petitioner’s conduct); In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 930, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (conviction based on constitutionally overbroad interpretation of statute); In re Demillo (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 598, 121 Cal. Rptr. 725 (unauthorized conviction where the statute of limitations was violated); In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 926, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244 (unauthorized first degree murder conviction where jury did not enter verdict on degree); In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal. 2d 171 (unauthorized sentence imposed for crime that was not charged or proven); In re Huffman (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 552, 229 Cal. Rptr. 789 (sentence not authorized by any statute); In re Haygood (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 802, 122 Cal. Rptr. 760 (sentence term erroneously calculated); In re Adams (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 629,122 Cal. Rptr. 73 (invalid multiple punishment for single criminal act); or
- there has been a change in the law affecting the petitioner.
This article would not have been possible without reference to The California Prison and Parole Law Handbook by the Prison Law Office. We thank the Prison Law Office for their excellent work.
