Recovery of Attorney Fees in Prison Litigation Reform Act

Adree Edmo, aka Mason Edmo, filed a federal civil rights action (Edmo v. Corizon, Inc.) against the State of Idaho, a private prison company called Corizon and individual prison officials while she was incarcerated at an Idaho prison in 2017.  

After the district court found in her favor, she made a request for the recovery of attorney fees, as is permitted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and the district court awarded her $2,586,048.80 in attorney fees.

The State of Idaho, Corizon and the individual prison officials then appealed this award to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  We present this summary here for our reader because the Ninth Circuit’s ruling applies to similar appeals and similar attorney fee issues in federal court within California.

Ms. Edmo’s underlying civil rights case demanded that Corizon and others provide her with gender-affirming medical care, including surgery, as well as gender-appropriate clothing and personal items.  Her complaint alleged, in part, violation of her Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment for denial of such gender-related items and surgery.  

Her lawsuit also alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause for retaliating against her based on her gender identity, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the American’s with Disabilities Act and negligence under Idaho law.  

The district court granted injunctive relief (ordering surgery), but on appeal, the order was stayed and then dismissed .  The district court denied injunctive relief based on Ms. Edmo’s Fourteenth Amendment and ACA claims.

Ms. Edmo then received the surgery in July, 2020, and thereafter, a settlement was reached with her, requiring her to dismiss some of her other claims.

Ms. Edmo then made a motion for an award of attorney fees and the district court granted this request up until the injunction became permanent and all appeals resolved.  The judge followed the two-step “lodestar approach” with enhancements and certain multipliers.

Defendants then appealed the attorney fees award, arguing that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prisoners may only seek attorney fees directly and reasonably incurred in proving actual violation of their civil rights.  Therefore, only successful claims are compensable and time that attorneys spend on unsuccessful claims must be excluded from the lodestar calculation.

The Ninth Circuit agreed.  It explained that a district court has broad discretion in calculating attorneys’ fees. A.D. v. California Highway Patrol (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3d 446, 450.  Consequently, an appellate court reviews the award for an abuse of discretion and must “affirm unless the district court applied the wrong legal standard or its findings were illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood (9th Cir. 2013) 729 F.3d 1196, 1201-1202.  The Ninth Circuit added that the district court also must “fully explain its reasoning in making an award.” McCown v. City of Fontana (9th Cir. 2009) 565 F. 3d 1097, 1102.

The Ninth Circuit then explained that the two-step lodestar approach first required the court to tally the number of hours an attorney reasonably expended on the prevailing party’s case.  Gonzalez, supra, at 1202.  The number of hours is then multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, based on evidence of the market rate for the services provided.  See Gates v. Deukmejian (9th Cir. 1992) 987 F. 2d 1392, 1397-98.  The result of this equation is the lodestar figure, which is treated as a presumptively reasonable award.

The court then proceeds to the second step: considering whether to enhance the award based on factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc. (9th Cir. 1975) 526 F. 2d 67, 70.  These factors include, but are not limited to the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, whether the fee is contingent or fixed, the results obtained, the “undesirability” of the case, and awards in similar cases.

If an enhancement is justified, then the judge “may adjust the lodestar figure upward . . . using a multiplier.” Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co. (9th Cir. 2000) 214 F. 3d 1041, 1045.

The Ninth Circuit then discussed attorneys’ fees in prisoner civil rights cases and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and reminded the reader that under this act, only attorneys’ fee litigating successful claims are compensable, and time spent on unsuccessful claims must be excluded from the lodestar calculation. Dannenberg v. Valadez (9th Cir. 2003) 338 F. 3d 1070, 1075.  

Turning to the district court’s calculation of the lodestar figure, the Ninth Circuit found that it included time Edmo’s attorneys spent on successful and unsuccessful claims and this was an error.

For this reason, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part the district court’s calculation of the lodestar, affirmed in part as to application of an enhancement and remanded for recalculation of the lodestar.