Correcting Misstated Credits After Sentence Final?

Our office receives a lot of calls from prisoners, family members of prisoners and fiancés of prisoners asking how one can correct misstated custody credits.  Often times, the credits are calculated correctly.  Sometimes, however, the credits are clearly miscalculated.

The call is usually years after sentencing and the sentence is final, so we tell the caller that one cannot ask the trial court judge to correct the credits.  Instead, the appellate court must do so, which most callers respond to by saying, “Are you sure?” suggesting we are wrong.

These calls have become more frequent over the last few years with the flood of new laws affecting sentencing, as well as George Gascon’s new policies, most of which have been misinterpreted as retroactive and mandatory for judges to apply, which is almost entirely wrong.

So, with this in mind, we present the recently (June 27, 2024) published ruling in People v. Tarrell Ivory Boyd from the Fourth Appellate District, a case that originated out of the Riverside Superior Court.

In 2000, a jury in Riverside Superior Court convicted Mr. Boyd of four felonies: assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Penal Code § 245(b)), shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle (Penal Code § 246), possession of a firearm by a felon (former Penal Code § 12021(a)(1)), and dissuading a witness (Penal Code § 136.1(a)).  The personal firearm use enhancement (Penal Code § 12022.5), prior serious felony conviction enhancement (Penal Code § 667(a)) and prior strike conviction enhancement (Penal Code §§ 667(b) – (i), 1170.12) were also found true and the trial court imposed consecutive sentences on all counts.

In all, the trial court sentenced Mr. Boyd to 27 years in state prison with 610 days of custody credit (Penal Code § 2900.5) and 91 days of conduct credits (Penal Code §§ 2933.1(c), 4019).

In 2023, seventeen years into his sentence, Mr. Boyd moved for recalculation of his credits and a new sentencing hearing.  He argued that his custody credits should have started accruing from the date of his arrest on a different case, not the date the complaint was filed and he made his first appearance in the current case, which was several days later.

At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed that Mr. Boyd should have received 616 days of custody credit and 92 days of conduct credit.  The judge, Elaine M. Kiefer, ordered a new abstract of judgment to reflect the corrected credits.

Mr. Boyd then appealed this ruling to the Fourth Appellate District Court in Riverside, arguing that the original error warranted a full resentencing to consider the effect of ameliorative sentencing laws passed after his original sentencing hearing.  He pointed to Senate Bill No. 620, which allows the trial court to strike firearm enhancements, Senate Bill No. 1393, which allows the trial court to strike serious felony enhancements, and Assembly Bill No. 124, which created a presumption that the low prison term is proper when defendant is under age 26 years of age at the time of the offense.  

The Fourth Appellate District Court responded by denying Mr. Boyd’s appeal and holding that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to consider Mr. Boyd’s freestanding motion since his sentence had long been made final.

The Fourth District explained that in order to establish jurisdiction for a postjudgment claim that credits were improperly calculated at sentencing, an inmate must instead file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  

The Fourth District therefore vacated the trial court’s order, which is characterized as “void from the start.”  However, given the circumstances, it treated Mr. Boyd’s appeal as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, granted the petition and modified the sentence to reflect the undisputed credits.

The appellate court then rejected Mr. Boyd’s claim that he was entitled to full resentencing because none of the laws Mr. Boyd pointed to (SB 620, SB 1393 and AB 124) are intended to apply to cases with a final sentence.

Mr. Boyd then pointed to four cases where he claimed court have held that full resentencing rules apply, but the Fourth District pointed out in each one that each case involved unanalogous situations.  

People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal. App. 5th 37, 294 Cal. Rptr.3d 355 involved new laws (Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)) that applied only to judgments that had not yet been made final.  People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal. 5th 857, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84, 422 P. 3d 531 and People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal. App. 5th 970, 286 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771 involved laws (Proposition 47 and section 1172.6, respectively) that allow for recall of a sentence, which in turn required full resentencing (see Buycks, supra, at p. 893, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84, 422 P. 3d 531.) Lastly, People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal. 5th 152, 293 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 509 P. 3d 975 did not involve the full resentencing rule at all.  It involved a case where, on a habeas petition, there was a resentencing for application of new law that warranted reconsideration of the sentence, which our Supreme Court held reopened the sentence for consideration of another new law.  

Here, Mr. Boyd’s correction of his custody credits did not warrant a resentencing to reconsider the sentence at all, but simply a correction to award seven more days of custody credits.  Because Boyd's case “had been made final and no law allowing for recall of his sentence applies, his reliance on these cases was misplaced.”

We present this summary as a cautionary tale to those in custody with final sentences that full resentencing to shave off years from a sentence cannot be “backdoored” as so many callers hope, particularly when there is an error of just seven days in custody credits. 

 

Moreover, any attorney who accepts payment to “petition for resentencing” as the inmate so desperately wants is incompetent or unethical, or perhaps both.