No CRJA Violation for Defense Counsel Testimony Advice

The California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), which became effective on January 1, 2021, has the legislative intent “to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.” Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal. App. 5th 138, 149-150.

The goal of the CRJA, codified at Penal Code § 745, is “to provide remedies that will eliminate racially discriminatory practices in the criminal justice system in addition to intentional discrimination.” It provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.”

The CRJA includes four types of conduct, any one of which, is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establishes a violation of the CRJA: “(1)[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin; (2) [d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court or during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin, whether or not purposeful. This paragraph does not apply if the person speaking is relating language used by another that is relevant to the case or if the person speaking is using a racially neutral and unbiased physical description of the suspect.”

A defendant may file a motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a motion under Penal Code § 1473.7 in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of the CRJA. For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging violation on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.

In the Humboldt County Superior Court case of People v. Demetrius Coleman, the People alleged that Mr. Coleman committed first degree murder with special circumstances that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (Penal Code §§ 187(a), 190.2(a)(21)) and an enhancement for intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (Penal Code § 12022.53(d)). The murder took place during a drug deal.

Mr. Coleman filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District (San Francisco), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple grounds, including that his attorney exhibited racial bias in advising him, when he chose to take the stand, to speak normally and authentically in his own voice, including if that meant using Ebonics and slang and “sound[ed] ghetto” when he testified. By doing so, Mr. Coleman argued, his attorney displayed implicit racial bias toward him.

Defendant did so and was convicted of first degree murder. He was then sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement and five years for one prior serious felony conviction.

Mr. Coleman argued on appeal that by testifying in his own way of speaking, he used street vernacular, improper English and other language inappropriate in any formal courtroom setting.

The First Appellate District disagreed after it read the entirety of Mr. Coleman’s testimony at trial. The appellate court noted that Mr. Coleman fully explained his version of events that led up to the shooting. The court noted that Mr. Coleman’s counsel asked Mr. Coleman to explain certain slang terms to the jury so that the jury understood what he was trying to describe. The court further noted that it is not unusual for witnesses of any race to use slang terms in cases involving illegal drug dealing.

The appellate court therefore rejected Mr. Coleman’s contention that his own testimony amounted to a violation of the CRJA because his attorney told him to “sound ghetto” and “use slang.” Instead, the appellate court stated that this was sound advice because his counsel did not want Mr. Coleman to sound like someone he was not. It is sage advice on the stand to “be yourself.” A jury would quickly recognize if he was trying to sound like someone he was not, ruining his credibility. Consequently, there is a valid tactical reason for advising defendant to not change his manner of speaking and to appear authentic and genuine before the jury.

Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.