California Racial Justice Act Case Specific Inquiry

The California Constitution, at Article IV, Section 13, states that “no judgment shall be set aside, or a new trial granted, in any case . . . unless after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office recently argued that this requirement, understood as requiring a “case-specific” inquiry, conflicts with the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), making the CRJA unconstitutional.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, disagreed in the attempted murder case of People v. Akeem Simmons, which went to trial at the Clara Shortridge Foltz Criminal Courts Building (CCB). This ruling deserves a closer look by anyone seeking to better understand how a judge should handle a CRJA claim.

As the reader of this article most likely is already aware, the CRJA, codified at Penal Code § 745, seeks to eliminate racism from criminal trials in California. The opinion in the Simmons case explains, by quoting the Legislative history behind the CRJA, that “[d]iscrimination in our criminal justice system based on race, ethnicity, or national origin (hereafter ‘race’ or “racial bias’) has a deleterious effect not only on individual criminal defendants but on our system of justice as a whole . . . Discrimination undermines public confidence in the fairness of the state’s system of justice and deprive Californians of equal justice under law.” Assembly Bill No. 2542 § 2(a). The Leglislature found that while racial bias is “widely acknowledged as intolerable in the criminal justice system,” it persists because “courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms.”

To end this continuing unfairness, Penal Code § 745(a) provides that a conviction shall be reverse and vacated if “. . . (1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited racial bias or animus toward the defendant because of defendant’s race, ethnicity or national origin . . .” This can be exhibited by “(2) . . . an attorney . . . used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race . . . whether or not it was purposeful.”

To raise a question of whether § 745 was violated during a criminal proceeding, the defendant “may file a motion in the trial court,” a petition for writ of habeas corpus, or a motion under Section 1473.7. Penal Code § 745(b). Such a motion must be brought at the earliest opportunity. If a prima facie case is made, then the court shall hold a hearing at which either party may present evidence of a violation or a race-neutral policy or procedure. Defendant has the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant does not need to prove intentional discrimination. Penal Code § 745(c)(2).

If a judge finds a violation has occurred, the statute requires the judge to impose: if before a judgment has been entered, declare a mistrial; discharge the jury and empanel a new jury; or if the judge believes the interest of justice would be served, dismiss enhancements, special circumstances, or special allegations, or reduce one or more charges. It after the judgement has been entered, the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence or modify the judgment to a lesser included or lesser related offense.

In the case of People v. Akeem Simmons, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Simmons as a “light-skinned” Black man. During her closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that Mr. Simmons was not credible and lied to several people, including to women to whom he “admitted to having an ambiguous ethnic presentation and that people who don’t know him think he’s other than Black.”

After being convicted and sentenced, Mr. Simmons asked to vacate the conviction and his sentence based on the DA’s racially derogatory comments throughout trial about his race. The DA’s office even conceded that the DA violated the CRJA.

The judge did not follow a standard prima facie case analysis and simply set an order to show cause hearing why the conviction and sentence should not be vacated.

The DA’s office opposed an order vacating the conviction and sentence, arguing the CRJA violated the California Constitution, Article VI, Section 13, as described above because the act does not require, as the Constitution does, a thorough evaluation of the case facts. Instead, it permits a vacating of the conviction and sentence if there is such a violation, without such a thorough evaluation.

The Second Appellate District held that there was no violation of the Constitution, as the Legislators presumably were well aware of the potential conflict but passed the law nonetheless.

Accordingly, the judge vacated the conviction and the sentence based on such comments and arguments by the prosecutor.