Making a Prima Facie Case under Racial Justice Act

As with almost all new laws, there are “growing pains” and seemingly, a series of appellate court rulings that help clarify the procedures, definitions and context of a new law.

With the California Racial Justice Act (CRJA), this is particularly true, as it is an ambitious new law that most criminal defense attorneys read with keen interest and perhaps, even surprise.

In a nutshell, it provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity or national origin.” Penal Code § 745(a). The CRJA sets forth four categories of conduct, any of which, if proved, is enough to establish a violation of section 745(a). One such category is “[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus toward the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”

Procedurally, the CRJA authorizes defendants to seek relief for a violation of § 745(a) prior to imposition of judgment, by motion in the trial court. § 745(c). If such a motion is brought, the judge shall, upon a showing of a prima facie violation of § 745(a), hold a hearing at which “evidence may be presented by either party, including but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony and sworn testimony of witnesses, the court can appoint an independent expert, and the defendant shall bear the burden of proof of a violation of § 745(a) by a preponderance of the evidence.

No published decision yet has addressed the prima facie standard under the CRJA. However, generally speaking, the prima facie standard is an initial burden on a moving party to proffer evidence that would support a favorable ruling without a court’s consideration of conflicting evidence put forth by the opponent. After a prima facie showing is established, there is a hearing at which time the opposing party is given the opportunity to rebut the moving party’s evidence.

The following summary exemplifies how a perhaps well-meaning judge simply “overdid” a CRJA motion before him.

In San Francisco County Superior Court, the District Attorney for San Francisco County charged Demond Finley, who is Black, with several firearm possession crimes after police discovered a handgun in the search of his car. He was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (Penal Code § 29800(a)(1)), being a convicted person carrying a loaded firearm (Penal Code § 25850(a), and being a convicted person carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (Penal Code § 25400(a)(1)). Mr. Finely was also on probation when the alleged crimes were committed.

Mr. Finley filed a motion under the California Racial Justice Act, claiming that police stopped and searched his car because he is Black. At the preliminary hearing, however, the police officer who made the traffic stop testified that he was on patrol in the 600 block of Minna Street in San Francisco, which he described as a high crime area. The officer ran the license plate on Mr. Finley’s car and it came back as belonging to an Acura. Mr. Finley was driving a Buick, so the officer made a traffic stop of Mr. Finley.

Once stopped, Mr. Finley produced the title and registration for the Buick, which showed the car was not stolen.

The officer then ran a check on Mr. Finley and found he was on federal probation with a search condition. The officer then searched the vehicle and found the loaded gun without a serial number in the backseat of the car.

The trial court denied Mr. Finley’s motion for failure to state a prima facie violation of the CRJA. The judge explained that in ruling this way he had to “take into account the totality of the circumstances.” The judge also made a finding that the officer did not know the occupant of the car was Black until he stopped the car and that the body-worn camera footage showed he treated Mr. Finley with respect at all times.

Mr. Finley appealed the trial court’s ruling to the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District.

The appellate court agreed the trial court had erred. It stated, “[i]n this case, while we commend the trial court for its thoughtful consideration of Finley’s motion, we must conclude that the trial court applied an incorrect standard of review at the prima facie stated. The court’s statements during the hearing on Finley’s motion demonstrate that it weighed all the evidence presented during an earlier preliminary hearing – both favorable and unfavorable to Finley’s motion – rather than focusing on and accepting as true the evidence that supported Finley.”

The appellate court then explained that “[a]t the prima facie stage of a Racial Justice Act motion, . . . the court just consider whether the motion and its supporting evidence state facts that, ‘if true, establish that there is a substantial likelihood that a violation’ occurred (§ 745, subd. (h)(2), italics added), and should not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, except in the rare case where the record ‘irrefutably establishes’ that a defendant’s allegations are false.” People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal. App. 5th 45, 56.

So, the appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine if Mr. Finley established a prima facie case for a violation of the CRJA and then, if this is established, hold an evidentiary hearing where it may make credibility determinations and weight the evidence.

We present this summary because it spells out how the prima facie hearing should be conducted in a CRJA motion.